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Abstract
The U.S. federal government has fostered a movement toward sharing information
concerning computer security, with particular emphasis on protecting critical infras-
tructure assets that are largely owned by the private sector. As information security
is paramount to accurate financial reporting and the provision of timely and relevant
managerial accounting reports for decision-making, the issue of sharing information
on computer systems security has direct relevance to accounting, as well as to public
policy. This paper presents a model to examine the welfare economic implications of
this movement. In the absence of information sharing, each firm independently sets
its information security expenditures at a level where the marginal benefits equal the
marginal costs. It is shown that when information is shared, each firm reduces the
amount spent on information security activities. Nevertheless, information sharing can
lead to an increased level of information security. The paper provides necessary and
sufficient conditions for information sharing to lead to an increased (decreased) level
of information security. The level of information security that would be optimal for a
firm in the absence of information sharing can be attained by the firm at a lesser cost
when computer security information is shared. Hence, sharing provides benefits to each
firm and total welfare also increases. However, in the absence of appropriate incentive
mechanisms, each firm will attempt to free ride on the security expenditures of other
firms (i.e., renege from the sharing agreement and refuse to share information). This
latter situation results in the underinvestment of information security. Thus, appro-
priate incentive mechanisms are necessary for increases in both firm-level profits and
social welfare to be realized from information sharing arrangements.
Key words: information sharing, cyber security, information security economics, home-
land security
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1 Introduction
The Internet revolution has dramatically changed the way individuals, firms, and the gov-
ernment communicate and conduct business. For example, the telecommunications, banking
and finance, energy, and transportation industries, as well as the military and other essen-
tial government services, all depend on the Internet and networked computer systems to
conduct most of their day-to-day operations. However, this widespread interconnectivity
has increased the vulnerability of computer systems — and more importantly, of the critical
infrastructures they support — to information security breaches. According to the Report of
the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure (1997, p. ix), “This interconnectiv-
ity has created a new dimension of vulnerability, which, when combined with an emerging
constellation of threats, poses unprecedented national risk.”
In response to this new vulnerability, organizations have created an arsenal of technical
weapons to combat computer security breaches. This arsenal includes firewalls, encryption
techniques, access control mechanisms, and intrusion detection systems. The federal gov-
ernment has responded with a major reorganization (forming the Department of Homeland
Security, which is responsible for cyber security and infrastructure protection), and is de-
veloping a National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space. Unfortunately, to date these measures
have met with only limited success. This limited success is highlighted by Richardson (2003,
p.21) in the Executive Overview of the 2003 survey conducted by the Computer Security In-
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stitute and Federal Bureau of Investigation, “the most important conclusion one must draw
form the survey remains that the risk of cyber attacks continues to be high. Even organiza-
tions that have deployed a wide range of security technologies can fall victim to significant
losses.”
Campbell et al. (2003) found empirical evidence that some security breaches result
in statistically significant decreases in the market value of firms. Further evidence of the
continuing problems associated with computer security breaches is provided by the fact that
Representative Stephen Horn, in his third annual report card on computer security, found
little improvement within the federal government and gave the federal agencies an overall
average grade of F (Matthews, 2002). The United States General Accounting Office (GAO)
has also been critical of the computer security activities of federal agencies (GAO/AIMD-
98-68; GAO/AIMD-00-33).
It is generally presumed that one desirable way of supplementing the technical solutions
to security problems is for organizations to share information related to computer security
breaches, as well as to unsuccessful breach attempts. The sharing of information related to
methods for preventing, detecting and correcting security breaches is also presumed desirable
because it helps to prevent organizations from falling prey to security breaches experienced or
stopped by other organizations. Additionally, such information helps organizations respond
more quickly with focused remedies should an actual breach occur. As a consequence of the
presumed benefits of information sharing, the federal government has been at the center of
a movement toward developing security-based information sharing organizations (SB/ISOs)
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such as the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC), INFRAGARD, Information Sharing
Analysis Centers (ISACs), Secret Service Electron Crimes Task Force, and Chief Security
Officers Round Tables (CSORTs).1 By encouraging the sharing of information among orga-
nizations, the government could facilitate warnings of homeland security threats or attacks
even before such threats or attacks are seen by a government agency. The Homeland Secu-
rity Act of 2002 (which established the federal governments new Department of Homeland
Security) also highlights the importance of information sharing (Public Law 107-296). Unfor-
tunately, this movement toward information sharing related to security breaches has ignored
a large body of research that points out the need to create economic incentive mechanisms to
facilitate the effective use of such sharing. Nowhere is the absence of these incentive mech-
anisms more apparent than in the federal government’s recent initiatives to help protect
critical infrastructure assets owned and operated in the private sector (e.g., in the formation
of ISACS). The purpose of this paper is to analyze economic incentives and economic welfare
aspects of information sharing among security-based information sharing organizations.2
Issues associated with information security are numerous and diverse. Many information
security issues are directly related to both the fields of accounting and public policy, and
to their intersection (as well as to a number of other disciplines, including computer science
and engineering). Since the concepts of information or information systems is central to the
very definition of accounting, a number of links between accounting and information security
immediately come to mind. First, information security is paramount to accurate financial
reporting and the provision of timely and relevant managerial accounting reports for decision-
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making. Second, since information, like other organizational assets, is valuable and should
be protected, information security comes under the purview of the internal control system
designed and monitored by accountants. Third, whether viewed as capital expenditures or
current expenditures, managerial accountants have a role in planning and monitoring infor-
mation security expenditures to help the firm gain a competitive advantage (i.e., spending
too much or too little on information security puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage).3
Thus, this paper’s analysis has clear relevance to the above noted links between accounting
and information security.
Some links between public policy and information security are also clear. The security
and reliability of the entire Internet is affected by the security measures taken by all users
of the Internet (Anderson, 2001; Varian 2002). Hence, externalities play an important role
in the study of information security. This fact, together with the threat of cyber terrorism
aimed at shutting down critical infrastructure industries, has brought information security
to the forefront of the public policy agenda. In the United States, for example, there have
been numerous legislative acts and executive directives/orders that are focused on providing
an environment conducive to facilitating information security among public and private
organizations (e.g., The Computer Security Act of 1987; Presidential Decision Directive
63, May 1998; Executive Order 13231, 2001; Homeland Security Act of 2002). By examining
the costs and benefits of information sharing as a means of reducing information security
breaches and increasing social welfare, this paper has important public policy implications.
Using the modeling framework of Gordon and Loeb (2002), we examine the welfare eco-
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nomic implications of sharing information related to the incidence and prevention of informa-
tion security breaches. In the absence of information sharing, each firm independently sets its
information expenditures at a level where the marginal benefits equals the marginal costs.
We show that when firms are mandated to share security information, each firm spends
less on information security. Nevertheless, the level of information security may increase,
decrease, or remain at the optimal no-sharing level, depending on the ease of substitution
between the firm’s expenditures on information security and those of information sharing
partner firms. Since sharing results in the cost of providing any given level of information
security to decrease, sharing provides benefits to each firm, so total social welfare increases.
However, due to free-riding on the security expenditures of other firms, decentralized in-
formation security decisions result in firms underinvesting in information security activities
unless appropriate economic incentive mechanisms are put into place. In other words, while
mandated information sharing offers the potential to increase each firm’s profits and total
welfare, without additional incentive mechanisms this potential is unlikely to be realized.
This is because each firm will be motivated to renege on any sharing agreement, provide less
information to other firms, and reap individual benefits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we review the
economics-based literature on information sharing. The third section contains the presenta-
tion of our basic model. The fourth section examines how sharing affects levels of information
security and levels of information security expenditures. Section five contains an analysis of
the incentives to share information. Some implications of our model are discussed in section
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six. Concluding comments are offered in the paper’s final section..
2 Economics-Based Literature on Information Sharing
Issues related to information sharing have been previously studied in the economics-based
literature in the context of non-security related organizations. Of particular relevance, in
this regard, is the extensive economics-based literature on trade associations (TAs), and joint
ventures (JVs). Trade associations collect information from the membership and dissemi-
nate that information to the members (and sometimes also to non-members). Models of
information sharing by Novshek and Sonnenshein (1982), Fried (1984), Gal-Or (1984, 1986),
Shapiro (1986), Kirby (1988), Vives (1990), and Ziv (1993), among others, have been used
to provide insights about the nature of TA’s. Most of these papers (e.g., Novshek and Son-
nenshein, 1982; Gal-Or, 1984, 1986; Shapiro, 1986; Kirby, 1988) model information sharing
in an oligopoly or duopoly using a two-stage game in which each information is first shared
and then the firms compete (without collusion) in the product market under the assumption
of either Cournot or Bertrand competition. The information shared in these models is either
information concerning an industry’s demand parameter (common to all participants), or
information concerning a cost parameter that is specific (a private value) to the individual
firm.
Papers in this area usually do not address the question of incentives to report truthfully.
Rather, it is usually assumed that if a firm joins a TA, then it would truthfully reveal
information at the sharing stage. With this assumption, the ex ante value of joining the TA
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is compared to the ex ante value of not joining to see whether information sharing or no
information sharing is the equilibrium outcome. It turns out that the efficacy of information
sharing is very sensitive to a number of assumptions, including the following: (1) the type of
information shared - (common) demand or (private) cost, (2) the potential value associated
with sharing information, (3) the type of competition - Cournot or Bertrand (4) the nature
of the products produced - substitutes or complements, and (5) the firm’s market share of
such products.
In the literature on TAs, sharing information has two effects. First, the information each
firm receives from the TA reduces the firm’s uncertainty either about the demand for the
final product or about the costs faced by competitors. Second, each firm, knowing that the
other firms will also have this information, will adjust its decisions to take into account the
adjustments by the other firms. This shared information allows the firm to generate higher
expected profits by making better quantity and/or pricing decisions. As Vives (1990, p. 413)
notes, “In general, the increased precision of the information for a firm has a positive effect
on its expected profits, while the precision of the rivals and the increased strategy correlation
have a different impact, depending on the nature of competition and uncertainty.”
As mentioned earlier, most of the literature on TAs assumes that firms can (and will)
pre-commit to truth-telling, and/or the TA can monitor or verify (i.e., audit) truth-telling.
One noted exception, in this regard, is the paper by Ziv (1993). Ziv examines the case of
a TA in which firm-specific cost information is to be shared and firms engage in Cournot
behavior in the competition stage of the game. In this setting, information sharing is valu-
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able assuming truthful behavior. However, in the absence of additional incentives, sharing
combined with truth-telling is not an equilibrium outcome. Firms therefore have an incen-
tive to understate their privately observed firm-specific cost so that competitors leave them
more of the market. For the model examined, Ziv (1993) derives an optimal signaling charge
that provides incentives for truth-telling, and for some parameter values that will result in
information sharing remaining optimal. Since firms have an incentive to understate private
costs, the optimal signaling fee has the characteristic that higher reported costs result in
a smaller signaling charge. Furthermore, the signaling fees may be paid to the other TA
members, so that overall TA costs are lessoned.
SB/ISOs, such as ISACs, are similar to TA’s in that both are information sharing or-
ganizations. By sharing information about information security breaches and attempted
breaches, SB/ISO members seek to promote the sharing of information about the common
threat environment. In essence, the organizational members of SB/ISOs seek to minimize
the sum of the costs associated with security breaches plus the costs of information security
activities. Furthermore, one would expect truth-telling and verification issues to arise in
security-based ISOs as they do in TA’s.
SB/ISOs also seek to promote the sharing of the technology related to detecting and stop-
ping information security breaches, as well as ways to repair damage caused by information
breaches. Of course, since an organization must expend resources to develop technologies,
methods and procedures to deal with information security breaches, sharing of this informa-
tion is likely to be qualitatively different than sharing the type of information modeled in the
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TA literature. In particular, a member may be tempted to free-ride and underinvest in new
methods to deal with attempted and successful security breaches in the hope of obtaining
solutions from other members for little or no cost.
Free-riding behavior is generally not addressed in the TA literature, although Vives (1990)
does talk briefly about free riding in his discussion of disclosure rules. However, free-riding is
addressed in the literature on research joint ventures (e.g., see Kamien et al., 1992). Firms
form research JVs to pool their research resources and avoid wasteful duplication of effort.
Kamien et al. (1992) use a two-stage non-cooperative game to model research JVs. In
the first stage, members of the research JV invest in R&D seeking to reduce the costs of
production, and in the second stage they face Cournot or Bertrand competition with each
other. They show that the highest social welfare, as measured by producer plus consumer
surplus, is achieved when firms coordinate the R&D decision and share R&D results for
Cournot competition (and, in most cases, also under Bertrand competition). This view
suggests that firms may actually be over-investing in security related activities (at least from
a social welfare perspective) by not sharing security-based information.
Recent papers dealing with the economics of information security for computer systems
have addressed issues relevant to the study of SB/ISOs. Anderson (2001) discusses a number
of perverse incentives encountered in the information security arena, including incentives of
organizations to free ride on the security efforts of others. Varian (2002) provides a formal
model in which the free rider problem is analyzed in the context of providing system reliabil-
ity. Gordon et al. (2002) present a general discussion of information sharing in the context of
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SB/ISOs, but do not present a model or formal analysis. Schechter and Smith (2003), draw-
ing upon an analysis of ordinary burglary by Goldberg and Nold (1980), provide an insightful
analysis of the benefits of sharing information to prevent information security breaches. The
model we present in the next section, unlike that of Schechter and Smith (2003), considers
the costs of providing information security and free riding aspects of sharing information
about computer security, in addition to the benefits provided by such sharing. Gal-Or and
Ghose (2003) offer a model of information sharing that is complimentary to, although sub-
stantially different from, the model presented here. The Gal-Or and Ghose model examines
how market characteristics affect the level of information sharing and posits functional forms
expressing how security investments and shared information on computer security affects the
demand for the final products, the marginal costs of producing the products, the costs of
information security investments and the costs of information sharing. This contrasts with
our model in which information sharing costs and benefits are derived implicitly by exam-
ining the effect on expected security breach losses. Thus, the focus of our model is on how
sharing affects the overall level of information security.
3 The Model
Consider two firms, indexed by i = 1, 2, that form an SB/ISO. For simplicity, we suppose that
each firm seeks to expend additional resources to enhance the security of a single information
set. The information set, for example, could be the complete confidential details about all
the firm’s customers, suppliers, and creditors. Denote Li as the loss to firm i, if the firm’s
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information set is breached. The loss could be associated with an attack on the information
set’s confidentiality, but could also be due to an attack on other dimensions of the information
security (e.g., a denial of service attack or an attack on the integrity of the information set).
In general, the loss Li would include the value of profits lost from sales, and some of these sales
(and profits) would be garnered by firm j, j 6= i. Moreover, the value of the lost sales and
profits arising from an information security breach would, in general, also depend on whether
or not firm j 6= i also suffered an information security breach. If the profits of firm i were to
increase when firm j 6= i suffers an information security breach, then this fact alone would
provide some incentive for firm i not to share security information (or take other actions)
that would reduce the probability that firm j would suffer an information security breach.
In order to focus on more subtle barriers to information sharing, our model takes Li to be
a constant, independent of whether or not the other firm suffers an information security
breach and, similarly, assumes that each firm’s profits, gross of any loss from breaches, do
not depend on whether or not firm j 6= i suffers a breach.
Members of SB/ISOs are typically asked to share information about security breach
attempts (whether or not these attempts were successful), about methods used to prevent
breaches, and methods to minimize the economic impact of a security breach once it has been
detected. For the purposes of this paper, we suppose that if a firm shares security information
with other member firms, a portion of the firm’s information security expenditure will benefit
each of the other member firms without diminishing (or enhancing) the benefit to the firm
providing the information. Let θi ∈ [0, 1] be the portion of firm i’s computer security
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information that firm i shares with the other member firm.
The probability of a firm’s information set being breached will depend on threat level
and the information set’s vulnerability. With information sharing facilitated by the SB/ISO,
the probability (for given threat and vulnerability levels) that firm i’s information set will
be breached, denoted, P i, will depend on the firm’s level of monetary expenditures on in-
formation security, denoted xi, the sharing partner firm’s level of monetary expenditures,
denoted xj, and the amount of sharing by firm j, as captured by the sharing portion θj,
j 6= i. We make the simplifying assumption that xj and θj only affect the probability of a
security breach to firm i through the product xjθj. Thus, firm i only benefits from firm j’s
information security expenditures when firm j shares information (i.e., when θj > 0) and
only benefits from increases in the sharing portion when firm j spends a positive amount on
information security (i.e., when xj > 0). We call P i the firm’s security breach probability
function, write it as P i(xi, yj), where yj ≡ xjθj, and assume that P i is a continuously twice
differentiable function.
Generalizing the Gordon and Loeb (2002) formulation, we assume that increases in
expenditures on information security reduce the probability of a breach at a decreasing
rate. Specifically, we assume P i1(xi, yj) < 0 and P
i
11(xi, yj) > 0, and P
i
2(xi, yj) < 0 and
P i22(xi, yj) > 0, where P
i
1(xi, yj) =
∂P i(xi,yj)
∂xi
, P i2(xi, yj) =
∂P i(xi,yj)
∂yj
, P i11(xi, yj) =
∂2P i(xi,yj)
∂x2i
,
P i22(xi, yj) =
∂2P i(xi,yj)
∂y2j
. That is, by increasing its own expenditures on information security,
firm i’s probability of having a security breach is reduced at a decreasing rate and, when
firm j 6= i shares some of its security information, increases in firm j’s information security
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expenditures decrease the probability of firm i having a security breach at a decreasing rate.
Assume that firm j 6= i sets its information security investment level at xj, and, for now,
we let θj be an exogenously given sharing parameter. We interpret the exogenous selection
of the sharing parameters as corresponding to an enforceable sharing arrangement specified
by the SB/ISO. Assuming each firm is risk-neutral, each firm’s problem is to select an
information security expenditure level to maximize its expected net benefit from information
security expenditures. This is equivalent to minimizing the total expected cost, where the
total expected cost equals the expected cost of an information security breach plus the cost
of the information security investment. Thus, we can write firm i’s problem as:
min
xi
£
P i(xi, yj)Li + xi
¤
(1)
The first-order condition characterizing the optimal investment in information security
(assuming that the optimal level is positive), xi, is:
−P i1(xi, yj)Li = 1, (2)
i.e., the marginal benefit from the last dollar spent on information security, should equal the
marginal cost ($1) of the expenditure. For a given level of information sharing, θj, equation
(2) characterizes firm i’s reaction curve xi(xj). When there is no information sharing, i.e.,
when θj = 0, xi is independent of xj. Thus, for the case of no information sharing, we can
write firm i’s optimal level of information security expenditures as a fixed amount, denoted
as x∗i , where for all xj:
13
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−P i1(x∗i , 0)L = 1 (3)
4 Effects of Sharing on Levels of Information Security
Expenditures and Levels of Information Security
4.1 The Restricted Case
In order to gain some insights about the general effect of information sharing, we first study
the effect of information sharing for a specific class of security breach probability functions.
Consider security breach probability functions which can be written as:
P i(xi, yj) = φ
i(xi + yj) (4)
where φi(z) is any continuously twice differentiable function from the set of nonnegative real
numbers to (0, 1) such that φi1(z)˙ < 0 and φ
i
11(z)˙ > 0, and where φ
i
1 represents the functions
first derivative and φi11 represents the function’s second derivative. Note that for this class
of security breach probability functions we have:
P i(xi, yj) = P i(xi + yj , 0). (5)
Thus, information sharing by firm j will shift the ith firm’s security breach probability func-
tion by θjxj, and the firms marginal benefit curve also shifts to the left by yj = θjxj. In
other words, if firm j spends xj on information security and there is sharing, the effect on
the probability of a security breach for firm i is the same as if firm i had increased its
expenditures on information security by θjxj in absence of information sharing.
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For the security breach probability functions belonging to this class, the first order condi-
tions (2) and (3) characterizing firm i0s information security expenditures with and without
sharing become:
−φi1(xi + θjxj)Li = 1 (6)
and
−φi1(x∗i )L = 1 (7)
respectively. Note that when there is no information sharing, i.e., when θj = 0, then xi = x∗i .
Otherwise, equation (4) characterizes firm i’s reaction curve xi(xj). Note also, if xj = 0,
then xi(0) = x∗i . Comparing conditions (6) and (7) and remembering that xi, xj ≥ 0, one
easily sees that for i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i:
xi(xj) = max{x∗i − θjxj, 0} (8)
which can be rewritten as:
xi(xj) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x∗i − θjxj for xj <
x∗i
θj
0 for xj ≥ x
∗
i
θj
(9)
[Place Figure 1 here]
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The reaction curves specified by equation (9) are shown for both firms in Figure 1.
The point where the two reaction curves intersect, denoted (bx1, bx2), represents the Nash
equilibrium in information security expenditure levels for a noncooperative game in which
each firm’s strategy choice is their level of information security expenditures and their payoff
is the expected cost savings from information security expenditures. That is, the payoff for
firm i equals [φi(θjxj) − φi(xi + θjxj)]Li − xi, for i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i. In order for each
firm to provide a positive level of information security expenditure in equilibrium, we assume
x∗i > θjx
∗
j for i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i. This condition means that the spillover from information
sharing is less than each firm would spend on information security in the absence of any
information sharing. The Nash equilibrium is found by solving the following simultaneous
equations:
bx1 = x∗1 − θ2bx2 (10)
bx2 = x∗2 − θ1bx1 (11)
yielding:
bx1 = x∗1 − θ2x∗2
1− θ1θ2
(12)
bx2 = x∗2 − θ1x∗1
1− θ1θ2
. (13)
From the definition of the spillover effect, when firm 1 spends bx1 on information security and
firm 2 spends bx2 on information security, the level of information security obtained by firm 1
16
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is equivalent to the amount that would have been obtained had firm 1 spent bx1+ θ2bx2 in the
absence of spillovers (sharing). From equation (10), x∗1 = bx1 + θ2bx2 , so that firm 1 obtains
the same level of information security (the level associated with spending x∗1) that it would
in the absence of information sharing. Note that although bx1 depends on the value of θ2, the
value x∗1, determined by equation (7), is independent of θ2. That is, the level of information
security attained by firm 1 (i.e., the probability of a breach) in equilibrium does not depend
on θ2. Similarly, from equation (11), firm 2 attains the same level of information security
(the level associated with spending x∗2) as it would in the absence of information sharing,
irrespective of the level of sharing.
While information sharing does not affect the levels of information security services at-
tained by each firm, from equations (10) and (11), we see that when firms share information
(i.e.,when θ1,θ2 > 0) each firm spends less on information security than they would have
in the absence of sharing.4 Since information sharing yields the same level of security, but
at a smaller cost to each firm, total social welfare (excluding any administrative costs of
operating the SB/ISO) is increased as a result of information sharing. We now return to the
unrestricted model, in order to examine generality of these results.
4.2 The Unrestricted Case
When firm j shares computer security information, firm i’s optimal level of information
security expenditures will generally change. Whether these expenditures increase, decrease
or remain the same, depends on how the shared security information changes the firm’s
marginal benefits from information security expenditures, −P i1(xi, yj)Li. For the restricted
17
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case, marginal benefits from information security expenditures decreased. We generalize this,
and assume that P i12(xi, yj) ≡ ∂
2P
∂xi∂yj
≥ 0, so that the spillover from increased information
security expenditures by firm j, decreases or leaves unchanged the marginal benefit of firm
i’s information security expenditures. Given this assumption, the firm’s expenditures on
information security under information sharing will be less than or equal to the level of
expenditures without information sharing. This is formally demonstrated in the following
proposition. (Proofs of the propositions appear in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1 With information sharing, each firm’s optimal level of expenditures for in-
formation security is less than or equal to the optimal level of expenditures for information
security without sharing, i.e., xi ≤ x∗i .
Note that for the case where P i12(xi, yj) > 0, xi < x
∗
i .
5
The result that information sharing leads to each firm spending no more than it would
have without sharing generalizes to the unrestricted case. However, the result that each firm’s
achieved level of information security, as measured by the probability of avoiding a breach,
1 − P i, is unaffected by the sharing of information does not generalize to the unrestricted
case. The analysis of the restricted case showed that the level of information security may
not be affected by information sharing. The following two examples show that sharing may
also result in the level of information sharing increasing or decreasing.
To see that information sharing can lead to an increase in the level of information security,
consider the following probability security breach function for firm i:
P i(xi, yj) =
1
(xi + 1)(yj + 1)
(14)
18
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The firm, selecting xi(yj) to minimize P i(xi, yj)Li + xi, would select:
xi(yj) =
√
Lip
yj + 1
− 1 (15)
Thus, if there is no sharing, i.e., if yj = 0, the firm spends x∗i ≡ xi(0) =
√
Li − 1 on
information security and the probability of a breach becomes:
P i(x∗i , 0) =
1√
Li
(16)
When yj > 0, the firm spends xi ≡ xi(yj) on information security, and the probability of a
breach becomes:
P i(xi, yj) =
1√
Li
p
yj + 1
<
1√
Li
(17)
That is, P i(xi, yj) < P i(x∗i , 0), so that information sharing leads to an increase in the level
of information security.
Our second example shows that information sharing can lead to a decrease in the level of
information security. Consider the following probability security breach function for firm i:
P i(xi, yj) = e−x
2
i−2xi · (yj + 1)−1 (18)
For this security breach function, we cannot find a closed-end expression for the firm’s optimal
level of information security expenditures. However, using numerical methods, we can find
the optimal level for any given value of the parameters Li and yj. Let Li = 100. For the no
sharing case, i.e., yj = 0, the firm’s optimal level of security expenditures is found to be x∗i ≈
1.70, and the probability of breach is P i(x∗i , 0) ≈ 1.8548×10−3. For the sharing case, assume
that yj = 1 (e.g., xj = 4 and θj = 14). Then, the firm’s optimal level of security expenditures
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is found to be xi ≈ 1.56, and the probability of breach is P i(xi, 1) ≈ 1.9367× 10−3. Hence,
P i(xi, yj) > P i(x∗i , 0), so that the level of security is decreased as a result of information
sharing. Of course, the reduction in the firm’s expenditures on information security (from
1.70 to 1.56) more than offsets the additional expected loss due to the decrease in the level
of security.
One obvious sufficient condition for a firm’s level of information security to be enhanced by
sharing is that the other firm’s investment in information security is so large that P i(0, yj) ≤
P i(x∗i , 0). The interesting case to examine is when this condition does not hold, i.e., when
P i(0, yj) > P i(x∗i , 0). For this case, let x
E
i > 0 be the level of firm i
0s information security
expenditures such that P i(xEi , yj) = P
i(x∗i , 0). Whether or not information sharing results
in an increased level of security depends on the relative size of the firm’s marginal benefit
from an additional dollar of information security expenditure at (xEi , yj) and (x
∗
i , 0) (see
Figures 2a and 2b).
[Place Figures 2a and 2b here]
Noting that firm i0s marginal benefit at (xi, yj) equals −P i1(xi, yj)Li, the necessary and
sufficient condition for information sharing to result in increased security is given in the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 Firm i0s level of information security will increase as a result of firm j shar-
ing security information if and only if firm i0s marginal benefits from additional information
security expenditures at
¡
xEi , yj
¢
are greater than firm i0s marginal benefits from additional
information security expenditures at (x∗i , 0). That is, P (xi, yj) < P (x
∗
i , 0) if and only if
P1
¡
xEi , yj
¢
< P1 (x∗i , 0) .
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For given levels of (θ1, θ2), the reaction curves (x1(x2), x2(x1)) for firm 1 and firm 2 are
specified by equation (2). Let bx1 > 0 and bx2 > 0 represent the (interior) Nash equilibrium
in information security expenditure levels for the noncooperative game in which each firm’s
payoff is the net benefits shown in expression (1). The Nash equilibrium is the point where
the two reaction curves intersect. Hence, we have
−P i1(bxi, θjbxj)Li = 1, for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j (19)
Clearly, Propositions 1 and 2 hold at the Nash equilibrium.
Although Proposition 2 and the example preceding it shows that information sharing
could lead to a decrease in a firm’s level of information security, information sharing will
always lead to a decrease in each firm’s total expected costs. To see this note:
P i(bxi, θjbxj)Li + bxi ≤ P i(x∗i , θjbxj)Li + x∗i < P i(x∗i , 0)Li + x∗i (20)
where the first inequality holds because bxi minimizes P i(xi, θjbxj)Li + xi with respect to xi,
and the second inequality holds since P i2 < 0. Thus, the welfare of each firm individually, and
hence the combined welfare of both firms, increases as a result of information sharing. The
total social costs of all expenditures on information security, excluding any administrative
costs of operating the SB/ISO and externalities to firms outside the SB/ISO, for given levels
of sharing, (θ1, θ2), is represented by the following social cost function:
W (x1, x2) = P 1(x1, θ2x2)L1 + P 2(x2, θ1x1)L2 + x1 + x2. (21)
From (20), the following proposition follows immediately:
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Proposition 3 Assuming positive levels of information sharing can be costlessly enforced by
the SB/ISO, member firms will adjust their levels of information security expenditures so that
social welfare increases (i.e., total social costs decrease). That is, W (bx1, bx2) < W (x∗1, x∗2).
Proposition 3 provides a theoretical justification for the promotion of information sharing
organizations.
While one of the goals of information sharing is to increase the efficiency (i.e., reduce the
cost) of securing computer systems, another goal is to increase the overall level of security.
However, if firms are not responsible for the information expenditures of the other member
firms and can still benefit from such expenditures, then each firm will have a tendency to free-
ride on the information security of the others. In turn, such free-riding behavior generally
leads to an under-investment in information security relative to the level that maximizes
social welfare. The following proposition demonstrates that free riding is indeed a problem
in the context of information sharing.
Proposition 4 At the (decentralized) Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative information
sharing game, a small increase in expenditures on information security by either firm would
increase social welfare.
Let (ex1, ex2) denote the socially optimal levels of information security expenditures for firm
1 and firm 2, respectively (i.e., (ex1, ex2)minimizesW (x1, x2)). Note that although at the Nash
equilibrium total welfare would increase if either firm increased its level of expenditures for
information security, this does not imply that the socially optimal expenditure levels for both
firms are greater than the Nash equilibrium levels. While it is true that ex1 > bx1 or ex2 >bx2, it
is possible one firm would spend more than the socially optimal level on information security
in the Nash equilibrium. This could arise because one firm’s productivity of information
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security expenditures is much less than the other firm along with a significant spillover from
expenditures in information security from the more productive firm.6
5 Incentives to Share Information
In the above analysis, we assumed the degree of sharing, as measured by the value of the θs,
was exogenously determined by the coordinating agency and was costlessly enforced by the
agency. Since P i2 < 0 for i = 1, 2, we have:
∂W
∂θ1
= x1P 22 (x2, θ1x1)L2 < 0 (22)
and
∂W
∂θ2
= x2P 12 (x1, θ2x2)L1 < 0. (23)
Thus, if there were no enforcement costs associated with a sharing policy, increasing the
mandated degree of sharing reduces total social costs. Hence, SB/ISO administrators should
favor full sharing.
Now, suppose that each firm can select the amount it wishes to share, i.e., firm i selects,
θi, for i = 1, 2. We also suppose that the sharing ratio selected by a firm is made known
to the other firm, before each firm selects their information security expenditures. Let Ci
denote firm i’s total expected costs at the Nash equilibrium level of information security
expenditures, (bx1, bx2). That is,
Ci = P i(bxi, θjbxj)Li + bxi, for i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i. (24)
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The next proposition shows the inherent incentive problems with information sharing, viz.,
firms have incentives not to share computer security information.
Proposition 5 ∂C
i
∂θi
< 0 for i = 1, 2. If each firm is allowed to select its sharing ratio (as
well as its level of information security investment), the only Nash equilibrium sharing ratio
strategies are
³bθ1 = 0,bθ2 = 0´ .
That is, if additional incentives are not provided, it is in each firm’s self-interest to renege on
previously agreed upon arrangements to share information on computer systems’ security.
We now consider one possible way of altering the rewards to each firm to mitigate the
incentive conflicts given in Proposition 4 and 5. Assume that the SB/ISO could verify the
magnitude of the actual losses incurred (i.e., they could measure Li, if the ith firm actually
suffered an information breach). Suppose the SB/ISO were to charge each member for the
actual realized losses of the other member firms less an amount equal to the expected losses
of all other member firms at the socially optimal level of sharing (i.e., the full sharing level
eθi = 1, ∀i and the optimal information expenditure levels, xi = exi, ∀i) . Note that (1) the
losses of other firm depends on the amount shared by the given firm as well as the level of
information expenditures selected by the given firm and (2) the expected losses of all other
member firms at the socially optimal level of sharing and information expenditure levels are
independent of the given firm’s actions. Essentially, each firm receives a fixed subsidy (the
expected losses of the other firms at the optimal) less a charge that depends on the given
firm’s actions.
To analyze the incentive effects of such an incentive mechanism, we consider the extreme
case where the SB/ISO and each member firm knows the security breach function of each
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member firm and the potential losses from security breaches. For the two firm case, firm 1
would be charged L2, if firm 2 incurs a breach, and would receive the subsidy P 2(ex2,eθ1ex1)L2,
where (ex1, ex2) and eθ1 = 1 are the socially optimal levels.7 Firm 1’s problem of selecting an
information sharing level and a level of information security expenditures would be:
min
x1,θ1
{P 1(x1, θ2x2)L1 + x1 + P 2(x2, θ1x1)L2 − P 2(ex2,eθ1ex1)L2}. (25)
Comparing (25) with (21) and noting that P 2(ex2,eθ1ex1)L2 is a constant, one sees that no
matter what level of (x2, θ2) were selected by firm 2, firm 1 has the incentive to select (x1, θ1)
to minimize the social cost function (conditioned on the decisions of firm 2). Similarly, firm
2 would have incentives to minimize the social cost function. This incentive mechanism
fully internalizes externalities and makes each firm’s objective of minimizing its cost less its
subsidy identical to minimizing the social cost function up to a constant.
With this scheme, the SB/ISO’s net total subsidy to the firms is:
S =
h
P 1(ex1,eθ2ex2)L1 − P 1(x1, θ2x2)L1i+ hP 2(ex1,eθ2ex2)L2 − P 2(x1, θ2x2)L2i . (26)
Note that (ex1,eθ1) and (ex2,eθ2) form a Nash equilibrium (or else (ex1,eθ1) and (ex2,eθ2) would
not maximize social welfare), and at this equilibrium the net subsidy equals zero.
6 Implications
The U.S. federal government has encouraged the formation of security-based information
sharing organizations (SB/ISOs) with the goal of helping to protect critical infrastructure
assets that are largely owned and operated by the private sector. The government’s underly-
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ing assumption is that SB/ISOs could help to align the goals of both the business sector and
the federal government, which in turn would improve the security of infrastructure assets.
The first implication of the model and analysis provided above is that the federal govern-
ment’s assumption that information sharing would lead to a reduction in social costs (i.e.,
an increase in social welfare) seems to be correct (see Proposition 3). However, while infor-
mations sharing will allow firms to reduce the costs of attaining any given level of security,
we showed (in Proposition 2 and the examples preceding it) that it is possible for SB/ISOs
to lead a firm to reduce its level of information security.
The second implication of the model and analysis presented above is that SB/ISOs will
only reach their potential when appropriate economic incentives to share security informa-
tion are in place (see Propositions 4 and 5). In fact, without the appropriate economic
incentives, free riding behavior on the part of members of the SB/ISOs will likely lead to
underinvestment (in terms of what is socially optimal) in information security (see Propo-
sition 4). Unfortunately, the available anecdotal and empirical evidence indicates that the
appropriate economic incentives are not in place. For example, joining and reporting to
Information Security Analysis Centers (ISACs) is voluntary, with no incentives in place to
encourage full reporting and discourage free riding. As a consequence, members may under-
invest in the development of information security measures in anticipation of obtaining them
for free from other ISAC members and/or under-report breaches and attempted breaches of
their computer systems. The free-rider problem is compounded by the fact that members
of SB/ISOs are often concerned about providing competitive advantage to other member
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firms and protecting their general reputation. This provides an additional motivation for
members to renege on sharing security breach information with other member firms. Not
surprisingly, the little empirical evidence available suggests that the existing information
sharing among ISAC members is minimal.8 The lack of well-designed economic incentives to
encourage information sharing also appears to be a characteristic of most, if not all, of the
other SB/ISOs, such as INFRAGARD.
A third implication of our analysis is the need to identify the appropriate economic in-
centives, and mechanisms for implementing such incentives, for improving the functioning
of SB/ISOs. Such incentives could include, but are not limited to, subsidizing firms that
are members of SB/ISOs based on the level of information sharing that takes place, gov-
ernment subsidized insurance, and other forms of government regulation. Of course, these
incentives would have to be carefully constructed (with more formal auditing/monitoring
of member reporting) and evaluated. Indeed, it is easy to envision situations where per-
verse economic incentives are created (i.e., incentives are created that actually encourage,
rather than discourage, security breaches). Hence, the model presented above should be fur-
ther developed to enable the comparison of the effectiveness and the impact of the different
economic incentive schemes.
Examining the veracity of the argument that the appropriate incentives are not in place,
and discovering the types of incentives that would work best are, in the final analysis, empir-
ical issues. To date, the empirical data available related to these issues is largely anecdotal
in nature or, at best, derived from studies that lack a rigorous empirical experimental de-
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sign. Thus, the fourth implication of our model is that rigorous empirical studies related to
the structure and activities of information sharing organizations are sorely needed. These
studies would not only confirm the levels of information sharing taking place among mem-
bers of SB/ISOs, but could also shed light on the issues related to the appropriate economic
incentives that may be required to facilitate such sharing. In addition, such empirical stud-
ies could address the role of governance in resolving many of the thorny issues related to
SB/ISOs.
7 Concluding Comments
Sharing of information about threats and breaches of computer security lowers the overall
costs of achieving any particular level of information security, and thus has been promoted as
an important tool in enhancing social welfare. As a result, the federal government has been
at the center of a movement to develop security-based information sharing organizations such
as ISACs. However, while our analysis shows that information sharing does indeed offer the
potential to reduce overall information security costs and raise social welfare, some pitfalls
exist that may well prevent the realization of the full potential benefits. These pitfalls revolve
around the need to create economic incentives to facilitate effective information sharing.
The two pitfalls described in this paper are noted below. First, even if firms could be
trusted to voluntarily share computer breach information, the firms would have an incentive
to free-ride on the information security expenditures of the other members of an SB/ISO.
Such free-riding will lead to levels of information security expenditures below the level that
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maximizes social welfare. Second, and more importantly, without providing additional
incentives for a firm to fully and truthfully reveal security breach information, firms will have
an incentive not to share information, so that all benefits to information sharing disappear.
Although only one incentive mechanism, a member-funded subsidy was examined in this
paper, other potential incentive mechanisms that include variable SB/ISO fee structures,
government subsidized insurance, and government regulation are possible. The design and
analysis of such alternative incentive mechanisms awaits further research.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Since P i12(xi, yj) > 0
P i1(x
∗
i , 0) < P
i
1(x
∗
i , y). (A1)
From equation (2) and equation (3), we have
P i1(xi, yj) = −
1
L
= P i1(x
∗
i , 0) (A2)
Thus,
P i1(xi, yj) < P
i
1(x
∗
i , yj). (A3)
As P i11(xi, yj) ≥ 0, this implies
xi ≤ x∗i . (A4)
Proof of Proposition 2:
Suppose firm i0s marginal benefits from additional information security expenditures at¡
xEi , yj
¢
are greater than firm i0s marginal benefits from additional information security
expenditures at (x∗i , 0), i.e.,
−P1
¡
xEi , yj
¢
Li > −P1 (x∗i , 0)Li. (A5)
This condition holds if and only if
P1
¡
xEi , yj
¢
< P1 (x∗i , 0) . (A6)
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Since P i1(x
∗
i , 0) = − 1L , and P i1(xi, yj) = −
1
L , we have
P i1(x
∗
i , 0) = P
i
1(xi, yj) (A7)
Therefore, P1
¡
xEi , yj
¢
< P1 (x∗i , 0) holds if and only if
P1
¡
xEi , yj
¢
< P i1(xi, yj). (A8)
As P i11 > 0, (A8) holds if and only if
xEi < xi. (A9)
Since P i1 < 0, (A9) holds if and only if
P
¡
xEi , yj
¢
> P i(xi, yj). (A10)
By the definition of xEi ,
P
¡
xEi , yj
¢
= P i(x∗i , 0). (A11)
Hence, P
¡
xEi , yj
¢
> P i(xi, yj) if and only if
P (xi, yj) < P (x∗i , 0). (A12)
Proof of Proposition 4:
The first-order conditions characterizing (bx1, bx2), the Nash equilibrium levels of informa-
tion security expenditures, are:
−P 11 (bx1, θ2bx2)L1 = 1 (A13)
and
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−P 21 (bx2, θ1bx1)L2 = 1 (A14)
Note that since θ1P 22 (bx2, θ1bx1)L2 < 0 and θ2P 12 (bx1, θ2bx2)L1 < 0, we have:
−P 11 (bx1, θ2bx2)L1 − θ1P 22 (bx2, θ1bx1)L2 > 1 (A15)
and
−P 21 (bx2, θ1bx1)L2 − θ2P 12 (bx1, θ2bx2)L1 > 1 (A16)
The interpretation of inequality (A15) is that at the Nash equilibrium the benefits to both
firms in terms of a reduction in the total expected breach costs for a small increase in
firm 1’s expenditures on information security is greater that the increase in the expenditure.
Similarly, (A16) shows that at the Nash equilibrium, social welfare could be increased (i.e.,
total social costs cost be decreased), if firm 2 were to increase its expenditures on information
security by a small amount. Hence, a small increase in expenditures on information security
by either firm would increase social welfare.
Proof of Proposition 5:
At the Nash equilibrium,
−P 11 (xˆ1, θ2xˆ2)L1 = 1 (A17)
and
−P 21 (xˆ2, θ1xˆ1)L2 = 1. (A18)
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For Firm 1:
∂C1
∂θ1
= P 11 (xˆ1, θ2xˆ2)L1
∂xˆ1
∂θ1
+ P 12 (xˆ1, θ2xˆ2)L1
∂xˆ2
∂θ1
θ2 +
∂xˆ1
∂θ1
(A19)
=
£
P 11 (xˆ1, θ2xˆ2)L1 + 1
¤ ∂xˆ1
∂θ1
+ P 12 (xˆ1, θ2xˆ2)L1
∂xˆ2
∂θ1
θ2
From (A17), we know P 11 (xˆ1, θ2xˆ2)L1 + 1 = 0, so:
∂C1
∂θ1
= P 12 (xˆ1, θ2xˆ2)L1
∂xˆ2
∂θ1
θ2 (A20)
Taking the total differential of (A18), we find:
∂xˆ2
∂θ1
= −P
2
12 (xˆ2, θ1xˆ1)L2xˆ1
P 211 (xˆ2, θ1xˆ1)L2
= −P
2
12 (xˆ2, θ1xˆ1) xˆ1
P 211 (xˆ2, θ1xˆ1)
(A21)
Since, xˆ1 > 0, P 211 > 0 and P
2
12 > 0,
∂xˆ2
∂θ1
≤ 0. Therefore, as P 12 (xˆ1, θ2xˆ2) < 0, L1 > 0 and
θ2 > 0:
∂C1
∂θ1
= P 12 (xˆ1, θ2xˆ2)L1
∂xˆ2
∂θ1
θ2 < 0. (A22)
An analogous proof follows for firm 2. That is, firm i’s total cost is increasing in its sharing
ratio θi, i.e., without additional incentive mechanisms, each firm is motivated to renege on
any sharing agreement.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The CERT R° Coordination Center (CERT/CC) is a federally funded research and devel-
opment center operated by Carnegie Mellon University. CERT/CC publishes security alerts.
See http://www.cert.org/nav/index_main.html
INFRAGARD is an is a cooperative undertaking between the U.S. Government (led
by the FBI) and an association of businesses, academic institutions, state and local law
enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to increasing the security of United
States critical infrastructures. See http://www.infragard.net/
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 (PDD-63), Critical Infrastructure Protection,
May 22, 1998, tasked administration officials to work with the National Economic Coun-
cil and the owners and operators of critical infrastructures, and to encourage these owners
to create private ISACs. The vision for the ISACs was that they would be a place where
members could share information about security breaches with each other; share information
about how to prevent computer breaches; and serve as a mechanism to provide members with
government information on threats and attacks government agencies are experiencing.
CSORTs are regional initiatives that include a small number of Chief Security Officers
who meet on a regular, but informal basis to discuss issues of common interest.
2. We recognize that there exist personal relationships that lead to informal sharing among
individuals associated with SB/ISOs. Although useful, this type of sharing tends to be
unpredictable and ephemeral. The focus of this paper is on the formally sanctioned sharing
arrangements among the member firms of these organizations.
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3. Gordon and Loeb (2002) and Gordon et al (2003) have analyzed problems associated with
management’s selection of a level to invest in information security.
4. From equations (12) and (13), it also follows that ∂bx1∂θ2 ,∂bx2∂θ1 < 0, i.e., as one would expect,
the more the partner firm shares information, the less the firm will invest in information
security in equilibrium. To see this for firm 1, note:
∂bx1
∂θ2
=
θ1x∗1−x∗2
(1−θ1θ2)2
. Since θ1, θ2 > 0, sign
³
∂bx1
∂θ2
´
= sign(θ1x∗1 − x∗2). As x∗1 <
x∗2
θ1
by assump-
tion, we have the desired result ∂bx1∂θ2 < 0.
5. Note also that if information sharing (unrealistically) resulted in an increase in a firm’s
marginal benefit curve, i.e., if P i12(xi, yj) < 0, a proof analogous to that of Proposition 1
would demonstrate that a firm’s information security expenditures would increase as a result
of sharing.
6. For example, suppose Pi(xi, yj) = .5(.5[xi+.θjxj ]+1)2 for i = 1, 2, L1 = 432, L2 = 250, θ1 = .25,
θ2 = .5. One can easily verify that, x∗1 = 10, x
∗
2 = 8, bx1 = 6.99, bx2 = 6.29, and ex1 = 6.41,
ex2 = 8.45. Thus, bx1 > ex1, even though bx1 + bx2 < ex1 + ex2.
7. Note that under the information assumptions, the SB/ISO has enough information to
calculate the value of (ex1, ex2) for the full (and optimal) level of sharing,(eθ1,eθ2).
8. A recent security survey by Hulme (2002) indicated that approximately 48% of respon-
dents to the question “Who does your company notify after a security incident?” answered
no one. Less than 10% of the survey respondents indicated that they notified an ISAC after
a security incident.(p.22)
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